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I. INTRODUCTION 
The pandemic spurred by COVID-19 has illuminated in stark detail the 
threats to safety and health that have long-characterized the lived experiences 
of unsheltered individuals.1 The pandemic has brought to the forefront deeply 
rooted structural problems, which contributed to the social conditions now 
currently rendering houseless people particularly vulnerable to the brutal disease 
and premature death.2 Skyrocketing housing prices coupled with city-wide 
housing shortages have converged in recent years to create a nation-wide 
affordable housing crisis.3 According to a 2018 report by the National Low 
Income Housing Coalition, to meet existing housing demand, about 7.2 million 
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Hyland for exceptional research assistance, and to the editors of the Ohio State Law Journal 
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 1 See Homelessness and Health: What’s the Connection?, FACT SHEET (Nat’l Health 
Care for the Homeless Council), Feb. 2019, at 1, https://nhchc.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/08/homelessness-and-health.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AWJ-GKF7] (“People who are 
homeless have higher rates of illness and die on average 12 years sooner than the general 
U.S. population.”); see also Seiji Hayashi, How Health and Homelessness Are Connected—
Medically, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/ 
how-health-and-homelessness-are-connectedmedically/458871/ [https://perma.cc/59A5-
JQLE] (“In a study published in the Journal of the American Public Health Association, 
Monica Bharel and her colleagues found that homeless individuals used the emergency room 
almost four times more than other low-income residents of Boston.”). 
 2 See People Experiencing Homelessness, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/home 
lessness.html [https://perma.cc/78BR-JT2E] (last updated Aug. 10, 2020). 
 3 See generally NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF 
AFFORDABLE HOMES (Mar. 2018), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_ 
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NJL-LJP4] (discussing the shortage of affordable and available 
rental homes throughout the nation and, more specifically, in the largest fifty metropolitan 
areas). 
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more affordable rental housing units would have to be built across the United 
States.4 Although the severity of the problem varies across jurisdictions, the 
same report indicates that “[n]o state, including the District of Columbia, has an 
adequate supply of rental housing for extremely low income households.”5 In 
Los Angeles, perhaps the “epicenter” of the affordable housing crisis,6 the 
number of unsheltered people has increased 12% in Los Angeles County and 
16% in the city of Los Angeles—a 52% increase for the city since 2011.7 
Approximately 75% of homeless people in Los Angeles are unsheltered and live 
outside.8 
The housing crisis seems to have also prompted local jurisdictions to ramp 
up quality-of-life policing efforts in public spaces.9 In this Essay, I suggest that 
the housing crisis in particular provides a case study from which to scrutinize 
some of the historical and ongoing harms that flow from managing access to 
public space using criminal laws—and why constitutional prohibitions against 
status crimes, one tool in the arsenal of challenges against quality-of-life 
policing, fail to protect against overcriminalization. The first part of the Essay 
provides a brief discussion of some of the past and present uses of criminal law 
enforcement to regulate the boundaries of, and behaviors within, public spaces 
with a focus on how those laws served to reinforce racial, gender, class and other 
status hierarchies. In particular, I discuss how the use of criminal laws to 
regulate access to, and behaviors in, public spaces reinforces both existing status 
hierarchies and contributes to ongoing criminalization of historically and 
currently marginalized groups. In the second half of the Essay, I discuss the 
recent Ninth Circuit case, Boise v. Martin, as an entry point into a discussion on 
the constitutional limits of criminalizing acts that occur in public because, in the 
words of Justice White in his concurrence in Powell v. Texas, the person accused 
 
 4 Id. at 2.  
 5 Id. at 8. 
 6 Evan Symon, The Housing Crisis Part II: Los Angeles, CAL. GLOBE (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://californiaglobe.com/section-2/the-housing-crisis-part-ii-los-angeles-how-the-
housing-crisis-is-adding-to-the-homeless-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/G2E6-REUD]. 
 7 Benjamin Oreskes & Doug Smith, Homelessness Jumps 12% in L.A. County and 
16% in the City; Officials ‘Stunned’, L.A. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/ 
local/lanow/la-me-ln-homeless-count-encampment-affordable-housing-2019-results-
20190604-story.html [https://perma.cc/T8V9-EBKZ]; Reihan Salam, Los Angeles Is in 
Crisis. So Why Isn’t It Building More Housing?, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2019), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/how-solve-los-angeless-homelessness-crisis/591976/ 
[https://perma.cc/C3JE-6PC5]. 
 8 Jacob Siegel, Managed Obsolescence: Homelessness in America’s Gilded Cities, 
AM. AFF. (Feb. 20, 2019), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/managed-obsoles 
cence-homelessness-in-americas-gilded-cities/ [https://perma.cc/HXR4-4TA6]. 
 9 See Sarah Gillespie, Katrina Ballard, Samantha Batko, & Emily Peiffer, Addressing 
Chronic Homelessness Through Policing Isn’t Working. Housing First Strategies Are a 
Better Way, URB. INST.: URB. WIRE (June 29, 2020), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/ 
addressing-chronic-homelessness-through-policing-isnt-working-housing-first-strategies-
are-better-way [https://perma.cc/PF7G-W55Q]. 
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has “no place else to go.”10 I suggest that constitutional protections against the 
criminalization of status do little to limit or constrain an oft-ignored but harmful 
purpose of criminal law as applied to the policing of public space: the public 
ordering function. The public ordering function of criminal law highlights its 
role in targeting not only houseless individuals, but an array of marginalized 
groups deemed “out of place,” disruptive, disorderly, or dangerous.11 Centering 
in on this function of criminal law permits a more practical view of the limits of 
existing constitutional protections and provides a framework to better account 
for the full scope of the harms stemming from ongoing quality-of-life policing 
efforts targeted at houseless individuals and other marginalized groups.  
II. POLICING MARGINALITY IN PUBLIC SPACE IN  
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Quality-of-life offenses—nuisance laws, anti-loitering ordinances, criminal 
trespass laws, turnstile jumping ordinances, incommoding statutes, etc.—work 
to confine, segregate, and impede the movement of otherized, and oft-racialized 
bodies in public places. Police possess wide discretion to cite and arrest for 
quality-of-life offenses12 and even though prosecution or conviction may not 
follow citations or arrest, enforcement serves social control or managerial 
purposes.13 Beyond the role of criminal legal system actors, private citizens 
wield considerable discretion in deciding what behaviors to alert law 
enforcement to, such as determinations as to which behaviors allegedly 
constitute disorderly conduct, which actions constitute alleged trespassing, and 
which individuals are otherwise deemed out of place.14 Vague and broad 
offenses, like disorderly conduct, can facilitate nefarious forms of “community 
participation.”15 Indeed, private citizens possess wholly unbridled discretion to 
 
 10 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551 (1968) (White, J., concurring). 
 11 See Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law as Public Ordering, 70(Supplement 1) U. 
TORONTO L.J. 64, 76–77 (2020) (noting that criminal laws criminalize “ordinary non-
conformity”). 
 12 See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public 
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 589 (1997). 
 13 See, e.g., ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND 
SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 5–11 (2018); ALEXANDRA 
NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM 
TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 7–9 (2018); Issa Kohler-
Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 619–29 
(2014).  
 14 See, e.g., Antonia Noori Farzan, BBQ Becky, Permit Patty and Cornerstore Caroline: 
Too ‘Cutesy’ for Those White Women Calling Police on Black People?, WASH. POST (Oct. 
19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/10/19/bbq-becky 
-permit-patty-and-cornerstore-caroline-too-cutesy-for-those-white-women-calling-cops-on-
blacks/?utm_term=.867b6dfde2c5 [https://perma.cc/A34B-4H52]. 
 15 Id. (describing white women who call police on Black people for “trivial or 
nonexistent offenses”). 
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call on law enforcement based on what they deem to be unlawful conduct.16 For 
example, disorderly conduct ordinances provide mechanisms for communities 
to both determine which persons and which behaviors are deemed disorderly 
and then deputize law enforcement to facilitate removal of certain people from 
these public places.17 The regulating of racialized and historically marginalized 
people in certain spaces (e.g., gentrifying areas, white, affluent communities, 
etc.) has captured media attention through viral video accounts on social 
media.18  
Quality-of-life offenses disproportionately target unsheltered 
communities.19 Though recent media accounts have focused on the rise of what 
some have termed a “war on homelessness,” aggressive actions against the 
homeless are not new.20 Neither are restrictions on access to public space and 
the regulation of behavior in those public spaces for people, homeless or not, 
who occupy a position of precarity and marginality.21 For centuries, 
communities have used criminal laws to exclude negatively racialized and 
historically marginalized groups from accessing, using, or occupying public 
places.22  
Vagrancy, criminal trespass, and loitering laws were readily deployed to 
regulate access to, or behaviors in, public spaces among a wide swath of 
historically marginalized groups. Well into the twentieth century, vagrancy laws 
targeted a host of groups deemed undesirable, according to norms set by white 
 
 16 See id. (recalling an incident in which a white woman called the police on a Black 
father yelling instructions to his son during a youth soccer game). 
 17 See Ristroph, supra note 11, at 75 (noting that “catch-all” statutory definitions of 
disorderly conduct are “slippery” and allow for law officers “to determine on the spot what 
counts as disorder”). 
 18 See, e.g., Ginia Bellafante, Why Amy Cooper’s Use of ‘African-American’ Stung, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/nyregion/Amy-Cooper-
Central-Park-racism.html [https://perma.cc/VCD3-TTPT]; Elle Hunt, What Does it Mean to 
Be a ‘Karen’? Karens Explain, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
lifeandstyle/2020/may/13/karen-meme-what-does-it-mean [https://perma.cc/LQ6H-C9XT]. 
 19 Law Enforcement Violence Against Women of Color & Trans People of Color: A 
Critical Intersection of Gender Violence and State Violence, INCITE! WOMEN OF COLOR 
AGAINST VIOLENCE 18–19 (Aug. 1, 2018), https://incite-national.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/08/TOOLKIT-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L8H-ZT87].  
 20 See Ginia Bellafante, Are We Fighting a War on Homelessness? Or a War on the 
Homeless?, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/31/nyregion/ 
homelessness-shelters.html [https://perma.cc/W7K4RK6H]. 
 21 Kurt Iveson, We Don’t Know What We’ve Got Till It’s Gone – We Must Reclaim 
Public Space Lost to the Coronavirus Crisis, CONVERSATION (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.theconversation.com/we-dont-know-what-weve-got-till-its-gone-we-must-
reclaim-public-space-lost-to-the-coronavirus-crisis-135817 [https://perma.cc/JXL9-M6M8]. 
 22 See generally ANTHONY BRUNDAGE, THE ENGLISH POOR LAWS, 1700-1930 (2002) 
(discussing social class and the history of vagrancy laws); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S 
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (discussing 
gender and the prosecution of “bawdy houses”). 
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dominant culture, by criminalizing a wide array of conduct including but not 
limited to: 
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common 
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common 
drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in 
stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling 
places, common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around 
from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, 
disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually 
spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places 
where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but 
habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be 
deemed vagrants . . . .23  
Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century, a number of vaguely-worded 
laws criminalizing breach of peace, disorderly houses, and begging in public by 
people with physical disabilities or deformities, were deployed to target a wide 
range of conduct that rendered certain groups vulnerable to criminalization. 
Those groups targeted by such enforcement regimes included individuals 
labeled as “undesirables”—including racial minorities, single women deemed 
promiscuous, and people with disabilities.24 These laws equipped local 
jurisdictions with a ready mechanism for policing access to public spaces—
whether streets, parks, or walkways.25 For example, criminal trespass laws in 
particular targeted people deemed “out of place” in public spaces, and 
specifically targeted Black communities.26 In the words of Taja-Nia Y. 
Henderson and Jamila Jefferson-Jones, criminal trespass laws effectively 
constructed “Blackness as Trespass.”27 These laws have historically targeted 
Black communities in order to police spatial boundaries.28 As critical race 
 
 23 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 n.1 (1972) (quoting 
Jacksonville Ordinance Code § 26–57 (1965)). In this celebrated opinion, Justice William 
O. Douglas declared the Jacksonville ordinance void for vagueness. Id. at 162. See generally 
RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE 
MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016) (describing the history of legal advocacy to dismantle the 
vagrancy regime). 
 24 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. See generally Nina Renata Aron, In 
the 1800s, There Were Literally Laws Against Being Ugly (and No Surprise Who Suffered 
Most), TIMELINE (July 13, 2017), https://timeline.com/in-the-1800s-there-were-literally-
laws-against-being-ugly-and-no-surprise-who-suffered-most-c0b7a26ba8c9 [https://per 
ma.cc/XSD2-DF7F] (describing the rise of the “ugly law” and those disproportionately 
affected). 
 25 See Aron, supra note 24. 
 26 See, e.g., Taja-Nia Y. Henderson & Jamila Jefferson-Jones, #LivingWhileBlack: 
Blackness as Nuisance, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 863, 870, 905–07 (2020) (detailing an incident 
where the intervention of law enforcement was used to preserve a spatial boundary). 
 27 Id. at 879. 
 28 Id. at 879–80. 
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scholars have noted, Black communities were, and continue to be, routinely 
subjected to overpolicing and regulation in white communities29 and places that 
can be described as—to use the term coined by renowned sociologist Elijah 
Anderson—“the white space.”30 These criminal legacies continue to this day.31  
Nineteenth century criminal laws and local ordinances that explicitly 
regulated gender and sexuality also served to manage access to, and behaviors 
in, public spaces.32 Municipalities targeted bawdy houses, dubbed houses of 
prostitution, aggressively enforcing public welfare offenses with the express 
goal of policing female “virtue” by closely regulating sexual expression.33 
Similar efforts at regulating sexual expression in public targeted LGBTQ 
communities. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, laws criminalizing 
cross-dressing proliferated across the United States.34 According to William 
Eskridge, “By the beginning of the twentieth century, gender 
inappropriateness . . . was increasingly considered a sickness and a public 
offense.”35 Indeed, well into the 1960s, lesbian, gay, and transgender 
communities were similarly targeted through lewd stings and so-called 
masquerade laws as police ramped up raids and arrests.36 This violence and 
mistreatment against LGBTQ communities during those raids, according to 
some commentators, in part served as a catalyst for the Stonewall Uprising in 
1969.37  
Even earlier, order maintenance policing served to prevent indigenous 
communities from accessing and enjoying public space in and around the area 
that would become the city of Los Angeles. Professor Kelly Lytle Hernández 
explains how white settlers deployed criminal law in early Los Angeles as part 
 
 29 Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the 
Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1550 (2012). 
 30 Elijah Anderson, “The White Space,” 1 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 10, 10 (2015); see 
also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being 
“Out of Place” from Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1119 (2017); 
Addie C. Rolnick, Defending White Space, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639, 1691, 1702 (2019). 
 31 See P.R. Lockhart, Living While Black and the Criminalization of Blackness: White 
People Calling 911 on Black People for Things Like Napping and Sitting in Starbucks Points 
to a Deeper Problem, VOX (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.vox.com/explainers/2018/8/1/ 
17616528/racial-profiling-police-911-living-while-black (on file with the Ohio State Law 
Journal); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 32 See NOVAK, supra note 22, at 166–68. 
 33 Id. at 162–71. 
 34 Hugh Ryan, How Dressing in Drag Was Labeled a Crime in the 20th Century, 
HISTORY (June 25, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/stonewall-riots-lgbtq-drag-three-
article-rule [https://perma.cc/D48E-5UZB]. 
 35 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 
28 (1999). 
 36 See Jordan Blair Woods, Don’t Tap, Don’t Stare, and Keep Your Hands to Yourself! 
Critiquing the Legality of Gay Sting Operations, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 545, 552–53 
(2009); Ryan, supra note 34. 
 37 See Ryan, supra note 34. 
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of a strategic campaign to dispossess Indigenous people of their lands largely 
based on pretextual justifications like public intoxication:  
[T]he Californios of Los Angeles had concerns about the growing number of 
Indigenous peoples living in and around Los Angeles. Too many indios, they 
complained, spent their days playing peon (gambling) at the village or drinking 
in grog shops near the plaza. . . . In January 1836, the ayuntamiento [city 
council] required all Californios to sweep across the town every Sunday night 
to arrest “all drunken Indians.” The [mayor] required all those arrested to pay 
a fine or be subject to forced labor on public works projects.38 
In Los Angeles, as Professor Lytle Hernández illuminates, the policing of what 
white settlers labeled as disorder in public space served to reinforce racist norms 
that linked Indigenous communities to criminality, immorality, drunkenness, 
and laziness. Criminality in turn justified their imprisonment and, subsequently, 
the forced extraction of their labor through state-sanctioned convict leasing.39  
In more contemporary times, order-maintenance policing has continued to 
serve to reinforce racist norms.40 For example, in a discussion of anti-loitering 
laws, Professor Dorothy Roberts has argued that “the identity of ‘visibly 
lawless’ people at the heart of vague loitering laws incorporates racist notions 
of criminality and legitimates police harassment of Black citizens.”41 Roberts 
goes on to explain that “[t]hese categories, however, are not created by policing 
strategies alone. [And while these] aggressive policing techniques impose 
norms on the community, they also reinforce pre-existing notions of criminality, 
disorder, and lawlessness.”42  
Similar racialized conceptions of disorder may inform policing of young 
people of color, particularly, low-income Black and Latinx youth, resulting in 
hyper-surveillance and regulation of these young people in public spaces.43 For 
 
 38 KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, CITY OF INMATES: CONQUEST, REBELLION, AND THE RISE 
OF HUMAN CAGING IN LOS ANGELES, 1771–1965, at 33 (2017). 
 39 Id. (noting “all unemployed Natives were to be arrested and sentenced to labor either 
on public projects of for private employers”).  
 40 See Jennifer M. Chacón and Susan Bibler Coutin, Racialization through 
Enforcement, in RACE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MIGRATION CONTROL: ENFORCING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF BELONGING 159, 172 (Mary Bosworth, Alpa Parmar & Yolanda Vázquez 
eds., 2018) (“[P]rofiling practices ‘bind and reif[y] the concepts of race and criminality, 
fixing them into the subconscious of the profiled, the profiler, and society at large.’”) 
(quoting Trevor G. Gardner, Racial Profiling as Collective Definition, 2 SOC. INCLUSION 52, 
52 (2014)); Ristroph, supra note 11, at 78. 
 41 Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 790 (1999). 
 42 Id. at 804.  
 43 See, e.g., Megan Guza, Pittsburgh Police Chief Outlines Efforts to Curb Violence 
Downtown, TRIB LIVE (Sept. 30, 2016), https://archive.triblive.com/news/pittsburgh-police-
chief-outlines-efforts-to-curb-violence-downtown/ [https://perma.cc/TH7T-WKGA]; 
Madina Touré, Report: Black, Latino Youths Still Getting Arrested at Disproportionate Rates 
in NYC, POLITICO (July 13, 2020), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/ 
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example, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, after a string of fights among youth, 
police officers cordoned off sections of the downtown center to prevent all 
youth from gathering in spaces close to commercial centers, office buildings, 
bus terminals, and plazas.44 Such tactics, although purportedly aimed at curbing 
incidents involving fighting led to an effective ban targeting Black and Latinx 
youth and preventing them from accessing, using, or enjoying public space.45 
Critics of gang injunctions have raised similar concerns about such broad spatial 
exclusions.46 Gang injunctions are civil court orders that prohibit alleged gang 
members from participating in “criminal gang activities and otherwise lawful 
activities that purportedly constitute a gang nuisance within a defined 
geographical area.”47 Individuals subjected to gang injunctions may be 
prevented “from associating with allegedly ‘known’ gang members in public 
areas or in public view.”48 These injunctions police access to, and enjoyment of, 
public space by Black and Latinx youth who are often presumed to be engaged 
in gang activity.49 According to critics, gang injunctions are not only ineffective 
but unconstitutional, violating civil liberties by labeling youth of color as gang 




 44 See J.L. Martello, Youth Brawls Draw Police . . . Disruptive Teens Roll Through 
Downtown Streets, PITTSBURGH COURIER (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.newpittsburgh 
courier.com/2016/08/10/youth-brawls-draw-police-disruptive-teens-roll-through-down 
town-streets/2/ [https://perma.cc/Q5SH-QBR7] (discussing a “series of Downtown brawls” 
that erupted following the July 4th fireworks display and an event on August 7, 2016 that led 
to more than 15 arrests).  
 45 According to 2018 data, approximately eighty-four percent of youth arrested in 
Pittsburgh are Black, with Black youth comprising the majority of arrests. Zach Goldstein, 
Pittsburgh’s Trend of Juvenile Arrests Explained in 4 Charts and Maps, 90.5 WESA (June 
28, 2018), https://www.wesa.fm/post/pittsburgh-s-trend-juvenile-arrests-explained-4-charts 
-and-maps#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/UJE7-A6VH]. Disorderly conduct arrests comprise 
the fourth most common arrest after aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, and marijuana 
possession among Pittsburgh’s arrested juvenile population. Id. 
 46 See, e.g., Melanie Ochoa, LAPD Gang Injunctions Gave Cops a License to Harass 
and Control Black and Latino Residents, ACLU (Mar, 23, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/ 
criminal-law-reform/reforming-police/lapd-gang-injunctions-gave-cops-license-harass-
and-control [https://perma.cc/ZK7S-N9QX]. 
 47 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Expand Preliminary Injunction at 2, Youth 
Justice Coal. v. City of Los Angeles, 264 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (2017) (No. 2:16-cv-07932-VAP-
RAO), https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/aclu_socal_yjc_v_la_20180315_order 
_granting_mtn_expand_pi.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9RJ-3V73]. 
 48 Id. at 10 (internal citation omitted).  
 49 James Queally, Los Angeles Barred from Enforcing Nearly All Gang Injunctions, 
Federal Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-gang-injunction-court-order-20180315-story.html [https://perma.cc/633Z-YSYH]. 
 50 Gang Injunctions Fact Sheet, ACLU N. CAL. (May 4, 2010), https://www.aclunc.org/ 
article/gang-injunctions-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/8JLC-MFPJ]. 
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Efforts to manage Black youth through containment and dispersal strategies 
ramped up during the so-called war on drugs.51 Professor James Forman Jr. 
describes the harms stemming from those enforcement efforts and the 
corresponding indignities experienced by Black youth in Washington, D.C. in 
the 1980s and 1990s in his book, Locking Up Our Own. Forman writes: 
[A] culture of impunity flourished with regard to less violent, but more 
common, police intrusions into the daily lives of black citizens. Swearing and 
yelling, making belittling remarks, issuing illegitimate orders, conducting 
random and unwarranted searches, demanding that suspects “get against the 
wall”—these behaviors rarely led to lawsuits or newspaper coverage. But for 
residents of the city’s poorest neighborhoods, especially young people, this 
treatment became part of the social contract, a tax paid in exchange for the right 
to move in public spaces.52  
During the crack epidemic, in cities like Washington, D.C., Chicago, and 
Los Angeles, fights over public space meant more than access; it implicated 
concerns raised by members of Black communities regarding neighborhood 
protection and personal safety. As Forman astutely notes, some commentators 
at the time viewed the “drug trade’s occupation of public space as a form of 
violence in itself.”53 Professor Forman describes how in response to this 
“occupation,” some Black leaders in Washington, D.C. proposed, and law 
enforcement adopted, aggressive policing strategies aimed at ridding public 
spaces of drug dealers and users.54 Forman contends that rising crime rates, 
concerns for public safety, lack of alternatives, and fear led some Black 
communities to support policies calling for aggressive, “warrior”55 police tactics 
and more punitive responses to crime, including stringent punishments for those 
individuals, overwhelmingly Black, who violated the law.56  
What history and contemporary trends suggest is that local jurisdictions and 
communities have used a number of criminal laws and enforcement strategies 
to police access to use and enjoyment of public space. As the foregoing 
paragraphs suggest, criminal laws provide discretion to state and private actors 
to determine who is considered to have a legitimate claim to access and reside 
in public spaces. Thus, despite the designation of spaces as “public,” public 
spaces are not open and accessible to all, in both a normative and literal sense. 
Stated differently, the imagined “community” has never included all members 
 
 51 See Graham Boyd, The Drug War is the New Jim Crow, 35 NACLA REP. ON 
AMERICAS, 18,18–19 (July/Aug. 2001). 
 52 JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK 
AMERICA 171 (2017). 
 53 Id. at 145. 
 54 See id. at 167–70. 
 55 Id. at 44, 155–56. 
 56 Id. at 17–46 (discussing efforts to decriminalize marijuana and the eventual failure 
of proposed measure); see also id. at 20 (noting that Blacks comprised approximately 80% 
of those arrested for marijuana possession). 
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that reside within a given community. Viewed in this light, the use of criminal 
law to regulate access to public space becomes a coercive mechanism that can 
be wielded not only by law enforcement, but also more privileged segments of 
the community, in order to define the boundaries of their communities—who 
has access to public space, who will occupy public spaces free of interference, 
and which behaviors will be tolerated in those public spaces. This possessory 
interest in public space confers the right to police the boundaries of the particular 
community, but it is an interest that is not equitably distributed. In gentrifying 
and gentrified communities, race and class privilege may confer a right to 
exclude, attaching a bundle of rights and benefits to white communities in 
particular, and in a manner that approximates Cheryl Harris’ formulation of 
Whiteness as Property.57 In this formulation, white communities are entitled to 
the benefits of order-maintenance policing as part of the primary objective of 
excluding marginalized “others” from accessing and enjoying public space.58  
Racism and class privilege are not the only factors at play in the regulation 
of public space. When individuals are arrested and detained for non-violent and 
disorderly behaviors linked to disability, criminal law functions to criminalize 
manifestations of non-normative physical and mental abilities in public 
spaces.59 Aggressive order-maintenance policing disproportionately targets 
disabled persons who are unsheltered and low-income with no place to go, 
which is apparent in calls from hospital staff to law enforcement for removal of 
so-called “unwanted” persons.60 For example, in one case, police officers in 
Portland, Oregon arrested a woman wandering in the waiting area of the Legacy 
Good Samaritan Hospital.61 A police officer arrived at the scene at 
approximately midnight.62 When he arrived, hospital staff informed him that 
there was an unwanted woman in the waiting area with no medical need and 
who refused to leave.63 Yet, the police report describing the incident notes that 
the unwanted woman was “76 years old, partially blind, experiencing pain due 
to ‘lingering injuries’ sustained during an assault at a homeless shelter, hardly 
 
 57 See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 
(1993) (investigating how the concepts of race and property are intertwined and reflecting 
on how property rights are contingent on race, including the right to exclude).  
 58 See id. at 1745–46, 1758. 
 59 See, e.g., Jamelia N. Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 33) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). 
 60 See SARAH RADCLIFFE, DISABILITY RIGHTS OR., THE “UNWANTEDS”: LOOKING FOR 
HELP, LANDING IN JAIL 3–4, 15 (2019), https://news.streetroots.org/sites/default/files/ 
Report-The-Unwanteds-Looking-for-Help-Landing-in-Jail-2019-June18.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/7VT7-T8Y6] [hereinafter THE “UNWANTEDS”]; see also Criminalization of 
Individuals with Severe Psychiatric Disorders, MENTAL HEALTH POL’Y ORG., https://mental 
illnesspolicy.org/consequences/criminalization.html [https://perma.cc/U7Q4-D3U3] 
(discussing such cases as so-called “mercy bookings”).  
 61 THE “UNWANTEDS”, supra note 60, at 4.  
 62 Id. 
 63 Id.  
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able to walk, and ‘most likely suffering from the onset of Dementia.’”64 Earlier 
that day, the woman had been seen at the emergency department of another area 
department.65 After attempts to call Adult Protective Services and engage 
mental health professionals failed, police arrested the seventy-six-year-old 
woman and then booked her into the Multnomah County jail.66 
As if historical and ongoing exclusion and marginalization on the basis of 
race, class, gender identity, disability, is not enough, the current pandemic 
makes it even more apparent that there is a need for structural change. Legal 
reform provides one opportunity for change, though for reasons discussed 
below, there is reason to be skeptical of transformative change through law. 
Existing constitutional protections do little to prevent marginalized groups from 
criminalization in public spaces. This failure to protect the most marginalized 
people reveals not only the law’s role in upholding these vulnerabilities, but also 
the subordinating role of criminal law in sustaining, through under-protection, 
conditions of precarity. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST POLICING MARGINALITY: 
A FOCUS ON STATUS OFFENSES 
Regulating marginalized groups in public space can be traced to efforts by 
states and localities to promote order and promote the general welfare.67 Yet, as 
I’ve suggested, regulating public space often targets for criminalization 
members of historically marginalized groups. What constitutional protections 
exist to limit such criminal regulation? Of course, state police power is at its 
height in efforts to maintain order—however vaguely defined—and preserve 
access to and enjoyment of public space. As the Supreme Court has stated: 
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon 
the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, 
appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious . . . . This Court 
respects, as it must, the interest of the community in maintaining peace and 
order on its streets.68 
Perhaps this is why few legal scholars have questioned the legitimacy of 
using criminal law as a tool for regulating and managing access to public space, 
which is in large part a set of policing activities centered on enforcing social 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See Benno Weisberg, Comment, When Punishing Innocent Conduct Violated the 
Eighth Amendment: Applying the Robinson Doctrine to Homelessness and Other Contextual 
“Crimes,” 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 356 (2005). 
 68 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)). 
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order and preventing damage to property or infringing upon property interests.69 
Historical and ongoing conflicts over access to, use, and enjoyment of public 
space highlight the central problems of criminalizing crimes committed in 
public because the accused had nowhere else to go. The use of criminal law to 
regulate access to, and use of, public space is never exclusively about criminal 
acts committed in public per se. Broad and extensive criminal laws necessitate 
enforcement priorities, which means that certain groups will be targeted for 
policing more than others—historically those “others” who do not fit white, 
middle class, cisgender, heterosexual norms.70 Furthermore, criminalizing 
behaviors that would not be criminal if done in private spaces often risks 
criminalizing acts of necessity.71 The Supreme Court’s decision in Powell v. 
Texas acknowledged some of these problems but failed to resolve them.72  
Powell involved a constitutional challenge by a “chronic alcoholic” who 
had challenged his conviction for public intoxication.73 The Supreme Court 
upheld the conviction in a plurality opinion.74 Four Justices held that Powell 
could not demonstrate that alcoholism was a status or condition within the 
definition contemplated under Robinson v. California.75 The court determined 
even if alcoholism could be defined as a disease or condition, it was not clear 
that Powell had been unable to control his impulse to drink and lacked the ability 
to control himself so much so that he could not resist the impulse to go in public 
while intoxicated.76 Justice Marshall, writing for the plurality, emphasized that 
it was the public nature of Powell’s voluntary conduct that made him susceptible 
to criminal sanction. Powell was convicted, according to the plurality, not for 
the status of being a chronic alcoholic but for “being in public while drunk on a 
particular occasion.”77 In supporting its reasoning, the Court made sure to note 
that the State of Texas had not sought to “regulate [Powell’s] behavior in the 
 
 69 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: 
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 581–91 (1997); see 
also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 
370–71 (1997). But see Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the 
Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-
Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 293, 295 (1998). 
 70 See Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal Justice System 
Is Racist. Here’s the Proof., WASH. POST (June 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/graphics/2020/opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-justice-system/ 
[https://perma.cc/X8F4-WP2C]; Ryan, supra note 34. 
 71 See Weisberg, supra note 67, at 356 (“[C]ourts . . . ought to recognize the policies 
behind laws targeting innocent conduct. The two primary policy rationales for camping 
ordinances––which punish sleeping, eating and other victimless activities when performed 
in public––are fairly intuitive, although one is considered by many to be legitimate, while 
the other remains unspoken.”).  
 72 Id. at 337–41.  
 73 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517–18 (1968). 
 74 See id. at 537 (plurality opinion).  
 75 Id. at 532–34.  
 76 Id. at 535. 
 77 Id. at 532.  
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privacy of his own home,” but instead “imposed upon [Powell] a criminal 
sanction for public behavior which may create substantial health and safety 
hazards, both for [Powell] and for members of the general public, and which 
offends the moral and esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the 
community.”78 Ultimately, a plurality of justices declined to overturn Powell’s 
conviction, concluding that the evidence in the record failed to establish that 
chronic alcoholics in general—and Powell in particular—were both compelled 
to drink and compelled to get drunk in public.79  
Justice White was the fifth vote in the Powell decision.80 In concurrence 
Justice White noted that yielding to a compulsion cannot constitutionally be a 
crime, but, in this case, Powell could have been drunk in private.81 Justice 
White, in concurrence, voted to affirm Powell’s conviction, agreeing with the 
plurality that the evidence in the record did not support Powell’s claim that his 
alcoholism compelled his conduct to manifest in public. At the same time, his 
opinion carefully distinguished chronic alcoholics who were compelled to 
public intoxication because of their “disease” and chronic alcoholics who were 
drunk in public not only because of addiction, but also because they had no place 
to go to drink but in public places.82 As Justice White explained: 
The fact remains that some chronic alcoholics must drink and hence must drink 
somewhere. Although many chronics have homes, many others do not. For all 
practical purposes the public streets may become home for these unfortunates, 
not because their disease compels them to be there, but because, drunk or sober, 
they have no place else to go and no place else to be when they are drinking. 
This is more a function of economic station than of disease, although the 
disease may lead to destitution and perpetuate that condition. For some of these 
alcoholics I would think a showing could be made that resisting drunkenness 
is impossible and that avoiding public places when intoxicated is also 
impossible. As applied to them this statute is in effect a law which bans a single 
act for which they may not be convicted under the Eighth Amendment—the 
act of getting drunk.83 
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve the conundrum Justice White 
discusses in his concurrence. However, more recently, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Boise v. Martin attempted to resolve the conflict by focusing in on 
choice as a prerequisite to criminalizing conduct by actors compelled to engage 
in life-sustaining conduct in public space.84 In Boise, six plaintiffs, some 
homeless and some who used to be homeless, challenged the constitutionality 
 
 78 Id. 
 79 Powell, 392 U.S. at 535, 537. 
 80 Id. at 548–54 (White, J., concurring). 
 81 Id. at 548, 553. 
 82 Id. at 551, 553. 
 83 Id. at 551 (footnote omitted). 
 84 Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 617 (9th Cir. 2019), modifying, 902 F.3d 1031 
(9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019). 
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of Boise’s Camping Ordinance and Disorderly Conduct Ordinance.85 The six 
plaintiffs were cited for camping on public property in Boise, Idaho.86 The Ninth 
Circuit held that “an ordinance violates the Eighth Amendment insofar as it 
imposes criminal sanctions against homeless individuals for sleeping outdoors, 
on public property, when no alternative shelter is available to them.”87  
The ruling prompted a vociferous dissent written by Judge Milan Smith that 
included, in a rather unusual move, an unattributed photo of a sidewalk in Los 
Angeles County lined with tents.88 The Supreme Court denied the City of 
Boise’s certiorari petition seeking review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
prompting a flurry of editorials and commentaries, some calling the decision a 
“blow to cities,”89 and effectively, “deny[ing] cities the right to combat 
homeless encampments.”90 In a written statement, former Boise Mayor Dave 
Bieter conveyed similar alarm:  
“We believe that the 9th Circuit’s most recent decision in this case leaves the 
city’s fundamental ability to protect public health and safety on its own streets 
very uncertain” . . . . “Without further clarification by the courts, our most 
vulnerable residents—the very people this suit purports to be protecting—
would be victimized by the conditions in camps that could crop up.”91 
Despite the outcry by some commentators that the Boise decision limits the 
ability of cities to promote public safety and public health, claims that 
municipalities now lack the ability to clear encampments or other obstructions 
in public spaces (perhaps through enacting restrictions limiting the times and 
 
 85 Id. at 603–04. 
 86 Id. at 606. 
 87 Id. at 604. 
 88 Id. at 597 (Smith, J., with Callahan, Bea, Ikuta, Bennett, & R. Nelson, JJ., dissenting). 
 89 See Erika D. Smith, Supreme Court Decision on Homeless Case Is a Blow to Cities 
Wanting More Policing Powers, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/ 
california/story/2019-12-16/homeless-boise-ruling-case-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/ 
2B9K-TW7K]. 
 90 Stephen Eide, Opinion: The Supreme Court Just Denied Cities the Right to Combat 
Homeless Encampments, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/ 
story/2019-12-16/supreme-court-denied-cities-right-to-combat-homeless-camps [https://per 
ma.cc/2AE4-UH8B]. But see Martin, 920 F.3d at 589–90 (Berzon, J., concurring) (“The 
[homeless] crisis continued to burgeon while ordinances forbidding sleeping in public were 
on the books and sometimes enforced. There is no reason to believe that it has grown, and is 
likely to grow larger, because Martin held it unconstitutional to criminalize simply sleeping 
somewhere in public if one has nowhere else to do so.”). 
 91 Xavier Ward, U.S. Supreme Court Decides Not to Hear Boise Case on Homelessness, 
BOISE WKLY. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.idahopress.com/boiseweekly/news/citydesk/u-
s-supreme-court-decides-not-to-hear-boise-case/article_23c49815-2db1-5152-aaa3-a33ba4 
adeda6.html [https://perma.cc/D4HY-UGSK]. 
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places where public camping may legally occur) are largely overblown.92 As 
Judge Berzon notes in concurrence:  
The opinion clearly states that it is not outlawing ordinances ‘barring the 
obstruction of public rights of way or the erection of certain structures,’ such 
as tents . . . and that the holding ‘in no way dictate[s] to the City that it must 
provide sufficient shelter for the homeless, or allow anyone who wishes to sit, 
lie, or sleep on the streets . . . at any time and at any place.93  
In short, what Boise does (it seems) is eliminate criminalization as a tool for 
regulating access at all times to public space—sleeping, camping, etc.—where 
there is not the choice of available and accessible housing.  
Even so, the decision may not be enough to prevent criminalization of life-
sustaining conduct by unhoused persons in public spaces. In centering the 
discussion on choice, the Boise court fails to grapple with the actual social and 
cultural conditions under which choice is exercised by persons vulnerable to 
criminal sanction in public spaces. For example, does the quality of the 
homeless shelter factor into determinations of what is “practically available”94 
to houseless individuals? In Boise, the Ninth Circuit noted in a footnote that “our 
holding does not cover individuals who do have access to adequate temporary 
shelter, whether because they have the means to pay for it or because it is 
realistically available to them for free, but who choose not to use it.”95 Is the 
shelter practically unavailable if the unhoused individual believes that, as a 
survivor of intimate partner violence, that person will not be safe residing at a 
 
 92 See Martin, 920 F.3d at 617 n.8 (“Nor do we suggest that a jurisdiction with 
insufficient shelter can never criminalize the act of sleeping outside. Even where shelter is 
unavailable, an ordinance prohibiting sitting, lying, or sleeping outside at particular times or 
in particular locations might well be constitutionally permissible. So, too, might an ordinance 
barring the obstruction of public rights of way or the erection of certain structures. Whether 
some other ordinance is consistent with the Eighth Amendment will depend, as here, on 
whether it punishes a person for lacking the means to live out the ‘universal and unavoidable 
consequences of being human’ in the way the ordinance prescribes.”) (citations omitted); 
THEODORE B. OLSON & THEANE EVANGELIS, GIBSON DUNN, MARTIN V. CITY OF BOISE WILL 
ENSURE THE SPREAD OF ENCAMPMENTS THAT THREATEN PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 3–7 
(Aug. 2019), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Martin-v.-Boise-
White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4AK-4C5E] [hereinafter GIBSON DUNN] (discussing 
how, as a result of the Martin ruling, cities will be prevented from stopping the spread of 
encampments and, in effect, threatening public health and safety); id. at 2 (noting that Martin 
held that governments may not enforce ordinances that criminalize public camping unless 
there is shelter available for everyone). 
 93 Martin, 920 F.3d at 589 (Berzon, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Martin 
v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1048 (9th Cir. 2018)). 
 94 Id. at 618 (“We conclude that a municipality cannot criminalize such behavior 
consistently with the Eighth Amendment when no sleeping space is practically available in 
any shelter.”). 
 95 Id. at 617 n.8. 
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shelter with a history or high rate of sexual assault and violence?96 The court 
similarly does not examine the ways in which enforcement priorities drive 
which conduct and which locations may be targeted for enforcement and how 
that may affect available choices. Would an individual be regarded as lacking 
choice, therefore preventing the state from targeting that person for punitive 
sanction, if the individual refused placement in a shelter hundreds of miles away 
from the place where the person has called home, in an effort to remove that 
individual and others from an affluent city, gentrified, or rapidly gentrifying 
area?97 The framework of choice on its own will not resolve these tensions.  
But the shortcomings of the choice framework in protecting against 
criminalization of status or condition, as ongoing debates about whether the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits criminalizing involuntary acts suggests,98 are not 
the only reason to suspect constitutional protections against status-based 
criminalization will be limited. The choice approach obscures a central function 
of criminal law: its public ordering function.99 Failure to recognize this central 
function of criminal law may lead to overstatements of the reach of 
constitutional protections against acts that are “involuntary and inseparable from 
status,” as welcomed as those protections may be for opponents of 
criminalization.100  
IV. CRIMINAL LAW’S PUBLIC ORDERING FUNCTION & THE POLICING  
OF MARGINALITY IN PUBLIC SPACE 
In a discussion of public ordering function of criminal law, Alice Ristroph 
notes that “[q]uite often, the interventions of criminal law are designed 
 
 96 Cf. Margot B. Kushel, Jennifer L. Evans, Sharon Perry, Marjorie J. Robertson, & 
Andrew R. Moss, No Door to Lock: Victimization Among Homeless and Marginally Housed 
Persons, 163 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 2492, 2495 (2003) (“One third of women (32.3%), 
27.1% of men, and 38.1% of transgendered persons reported either sexual or physical 
victimization in the previous year.”). 
 97 See Mike Baker, Homeless Residents Got One-Way Tickets Out of Town. Many 
Returned to the Streets., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
09/14/us/homeless-busing-seattle-san-francisco.html [https://perma.cc/9XWQ-J5QV]; Rick 
Paulas, Instead of Helping Homeless People, Cities are Bussing Them Out of Town, VICE 
(Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bvg7ba/instead-of-helping-homeless-
people-cities-are-bussing-them-out-of-town [https://perma.cc/2Y7L-GBT6].  
 98 See, e.g., David Rudin, “You Can’t Be Here”: The Homeless and the Right to Remain 
in Public Space, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 309, 312–16 (2018); Hannah 
Kieschnick, Note, A Cruel and Unusual Way to Regulate the Homeless: Extending the Status 
Crimes Doctrine to Anti-Homeless Ordinances, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 1591–94 (2018); 
Elizabeth M. M. O’Connor, Note, The Cruel and Unusual Criminalization of Homelessness: 
Factoring Individual Accountability into the Proportionality Principle, 12 TEX. J. ON CIV. 
LIBERTIES & CIV. RTS. 233, 246–58 (2007). 
 99 See Ristroph, supra note 11, at 78. 
 100 Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 617 (9th Cir. 2019), modifying, 902 F.3d 1031 
(9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019). 
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to . . . classify people and arrange them in a specific manner.”101 As Ristroph 
maintains, “order” in this sense operates in practice more like a verb, as in the 
“outcome of a continual and dynamic process of ordering,” rather than a clearly 
defined, objective, “fixed status.”102 Criminal law’s public ordering function 
can reinforce social or status hierarchies including those based on race, gender 
identity, and disability.103 Indeed, such public ordering functions may be 
justified by deeply entrenched stereotypes and norms linking certain negatively 
racialized and historically marginalized groups to criminality and disorder.104  
But beyond this, this process of public ordering features prominently in uses 
of criminal law to manage public space. In managing access to public space, 
criminal law can be conceived as functioning to sort and classify people while 
in those public spaces based on their perceived risk to (physical and social) 
order. As noted, the experience of order maintenance policing among houseless 
individuals provides a case in point. Houseless individuals are labeled as risks 
in public—risks to safety, risks to public access, risks to property values—to be 
closely monitored and regulated within those public spaces.105 Because criminal 
law is a readily available tool for social control, social problems like the lack of 
affordable housing are routinely characterized as problems criminal law can 
effectively address, even without any empirical support.106 Criminalization 
becomes the response to the problem not just because in an era marked by mass 
criminalization it is easy to cast criminal laws as an acceptable response to social 
problems, but also because the public ordering function comprises a large part 
of what (though often unstated) criminal law is used for: regulating such 
marginalized people in public spaces. In this light, it is easier to view the 
criminal regulation of homelessness as part of a long history of criminalizing 
marginality and precarity in public space and part of a broader ecosystem of 
criminal law enforcement aimed broadly at regulating social and physical 
disorder. This broad ecosystem includes law enforcement, but also includes 
aggressive policing efforts by private citizens, actively encouraged and 
empowered to monitor and look out for suspicious persons through an array of 
phone-in reporting systems and apps.107  
 
 101 Ristroph, supra note 11, at 79. 
 102 Id. at 64, 76. 
 103 Morgan, supra note 59 (manuscript at 6).  
 104 See, e.g., Andrew Johnson, Foucault: Critical Theory of the Police in a Neoliberal 
Age 141 THEORIA J. SOC. & POL. THEORY 5,21–22 (2014) (“The militarisation of the police 
is juxtaposed with the systematic racism evident in the mass policing and incarceration of 
minority populations . . . . The over-imprisoning and over-policing . . . is an intentional 
economic ordering of society . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 105 See, e.g., GIBSON DUNN, supra note 92, at 4–10.  
 106 See James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 
20, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/history-mass-incarce 
ration [https://perma.cc/3SGN-468K]. 
 107 See Hanna Kozlowska, Are Neighborhood Watch Apps Making Us Safer?, QUARTZ 
(Oct. 29, 2019), https://qz.com/1719954/mobile-phone-apps-like-citizen-aim-to-curb-
neighborhood-crime/ [https://perma.cc/S5Q5-UU3T]. 
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So what are the implications for criminal law’s public ordering function and 
the policing of marginality in public space? I’ll offer just a few important 
implications. For one, history suggests that policing people “out of place”—the 
“disorderly,” the “vagrants”–– in public space is surely not new, but rather the 
recent iteration of the ways in which society regulates marginality in public 
space.108 Contemporary laws that criminalize public space both reflect and 
reinforce social and status hierarchies, as well as demonstrate how criminal law 
enforcement mediates access to public space. Moreover, criminal law 
enforcement reinforces specific social meanings that in turn reinforce social 
status hierarchies that vary across time and place. These social meanings may 
work to associate “vagrants” with people who fail to conform to racial and 
gender norms, or distinguish “disorderly” persons from “orderly” persons based 
on class-based or ableist stereotypes.109 What these specific meanings or 
stereotypes are should serve the basis for future research. For instance, what 
social meanings do the enforcement of trespass or other quality-of-life offenses 
reinforce? How does the disproportionate policing of quality-of-life offenses 
within Black and Brown communities reinforce ideologies, policies, and 
practices that justify their segregation in low-income, underserved, and under-
resourced communities? Recent attention to the subordinating role of criminal 
law enforcement is an important direction for critical criminal legal scholarship 
to take.110 Finally, what does the historical and ongoing role of subordination 
through criminal law suggest about whether criminal law enforcement is ever 
truly on behalf of the people, or the “community”? Recent critiques of efforts to 
disrupt the twin social harms of mass criminalization and mass incarceration by 
democratizing criminal justice suggest the problems with efforts that seek to 
align reform efforts with uniform notions of community interest or input.111  
As I have argued, if we center public space in our analysis of criminal law’s 
public ordering—and subordinating function—we can better see how access to 
space informs notions of actual and normative community. We can see how 
policing marginality in public space is as much about community, and 
conceptions of community, as it is about democratic citizenship.112 In making 
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this point, I rely in part on Judith Butler’s theory of performativity and the 
connections among the body, public space, and democracy. As Butler writes:  
“The people” are not a given population, but are rather constituted by the lines 
of demarcation that we implicitly or explicitly establish. . . . Not every 
discursive effort to establish who “the people” are works. The assertion is often 
a wager, a bid for hegemony. So when a group or assembly or orchestrated 
collectivity calls itself “the people,” they wield discourse in a certain way, 
making presumptions about who is included and who is not, and so unwittingly 
refer to a population who is not . . . . [W]hen the struggle over deciding who 
belongs to “the people” gets intense, one group opposes its own version of “the 
people” to . . . the proposed version of “the people.”113 
Butler contends that the concept of “the people” cannot exist without some 
form of exclusion:114 
Of course, it is true that any version of “the people” that excludes some of the 
people is not inclusive and, therefore, not representative. But it is also true that 
every determination of “the people” involves an act of demarcation that draws 
a line . . . . [T]here is no possibility of “the people” without a discursive border 
drawn somewhere, either traced along the lines of existing nation-states, racial 
or linguistic communities, or political affiliation. The discursive move to 
establish “the people” in one way or another is a bid to have a certain border 
recognized, whether we understand that as a border of a nation or as the frontier 
of that class of people to be considered “recognizable” as a people.115  
In this moment, where the possibilities for transformative change provide 
those concerned with eliminating the subordinating effects of criminal law and 
the criminal legal system with a reason for optimism, we should not miss out on 
the opportunity to explore how the present moment reveals both the precarity of 
certain bodies in public space, as well as the precarity of democratic and 
inclusive citizenship as a political and social ideal.  
 
(“Margaret Kohn has delineated three kinds of common arguments for street peoples’ right 
to the city: the liberal (assertion of individual freedom and rights), the romantic (celebration 
of countercultural modes of living), and––what is for her the most effective approach––the 
democratic.”); see also id. (“‘Through their presence, people who are homeless are also in a 
better position to demand what they need.’ Art Honeyman’s approach to the politics of city 
space, resolutely democratic in this sense, insists on the necessity and the vitality of regularly 
‘seeing others,’ a model directly borne from a disability sensibility, the long experience of 
being told to hide from public view. His poems make clear that it matters not only that we 
see others but where we see other: persons, or disability, relegated only to the verge or the 
gutter or the curb are in no position to articulate demands.”) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
ANASTASIA LOUKAITOU-SIDERIS & RENIA EHRENFEUCHT, SIDEWALKS: CONFLICT AND 
NEGOTIATION OVER PUBLIC SPACE 187A (2009)). 
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